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Pittman: Pittman: Corporations--Are Nonvoting Shares Entitled to Appraisal Rights

Comments
CORPORATIONS-ARE NONVOTING SHARES ENTITLED TO
APPRAISAL RIGHTS?'
There is a difference of opinion as to the power of directors and a majority
of the members or shareholders of a prosperous and going corporation at common law to sell all, or substantially all, of the corporate assets.2 According to a
strict view of the matter, shareholders in contract with each other are considered
to have impliedly agreed to invest their money to advance the corporate objectives specified in the articles, and barring business disaster, there may be no
transfer of corporate assets and discontinuance of the business except with the
unanimous assent of the shareholders.3 There is no question, however, as to the
right of the whole body of shareholders to participate in the determination of
whether such a singular course is wise and expedient.4
The issue is now settled by statute in practically all states.5 In some the
statutory provisions have been adopted to relax the strict common law rule of
unanimity and substitute therefor the principle of majority rule. All the shareholders are entitled to have a hand in the determination of a course of action
vitally touching their investment in the enterprise, but all are bound by the
decision of a specified majority.6 In other states, of which Missouri is one, only
shareholders to whom management functions have been given are allowed to
vote on the authorization to sell formulated by directors chosen by them.7 In like
1. For one answer, see 6 MIssouRI PRACTICE HANDBOOK, MISSOURI BUSINESS
§ 17.12 (Mo. Bar C.L.E. 1962): "The right to object, and to
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secure appraisal of and payment for their shares is not limited to holders of
voting stock."
2. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 281 (rev. ed. 1946); 6A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 2947 (rev. ed. 1950); Warren, Yoluntary Transfer of Corporate Undertakings, 30 HAxtv. L. REV. 335 (1917).

3. See supra note 2. In Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155
(1904), the court refused to set aside an executed transfer because of equitable
considerations. See also Luehrmann v. Lincoln Trust & Title Co., 192 S.W. 1026
(Mo. 1917).

4. Warren, supra note 2, at 341-46.
5. For a review of statutory provisions, see 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
ANN. 369-84 (sale of assets),

318-27 (merger and consolidation) (1960).

6. E.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c) (3) (sale of assets), 55-101(a) (amendments), 55-108(b) (merger and consolidation) (Supp. 1957). Each outstanding
share is allowed to vote on the proposed change, whether or not it is entitled to
vote by the provisions of the articles of incorporation.
7. § 351.400(3), RSMo 1959: "Such authorization [to sell] shall require
the affirmative vote of the holders of at least three-fourths of the outstanding
shares entitled to vote at such meeting"; and § 351.245.1, RSMo 1959: "Each out-
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manner, in Missouri approval of an agreement of merger or consolidation is
sought only from a select class of shareholders which may, indeed, represent but
a small minority of corporate investors.8
The prescribed statutory procedure to obtain shareholder approval of a reorganizational plan involving sale of assets, merger or consolidation commences
with the giving of notice of the shareholders' meeting at which approval will
be sought. Only holders of voting shares are entitled to notice of the meeting.9
Nonvoting preferred or common shareholders are without a right to notice, and
for good reason: since they may neither vote for or against the proposed plan
changing the character of their investment, prior notice of the meeting would be
a vain thing. It is arguable that statutory denial of the right to be notified of
the meeting and its purpose is itself counter-evidence of an intention to grant
any right the assertion of which depends upon suitable prior notice.Y°
To the holder of voting shares, prior notice of the meeting has a two-fold
significance. It affords him an opportunity to be indifferently absent or prudently
on hand to express by his vote approval or disapproval of the proposed alteration
of the fundamental agreement. Also, it gives him from ten to thirty days to
decide whether to withold his approval; if he does, to choose whether to go
along with the majority notwithstanding his disapproval; if he does not, to
elect whether to take the initial step to assert appraisal rights by filing on or
before the day of the meeting his written objection to the proposed plan." It
is apparent that even a voting shareholder is obliged to move with dispatch,
once he has received the notice of meeting to which he is entitled. The point is
often made that under the appraisal procedure, rights are likely to be lost
through failure to learn of them in time to comply with the prescribed formalities.12
Consider now the awkward position to which the statute consigns the nonvoting shareholder temerous enough to claim appraisal rights. He is not entitled
standing share entitled to vote under the provisions of the articles of incorporation shall be entitled to one vote on each matter submitted to a vote at a
meeting of shareholders."
8. § 351.425, RSMo 1959. Approval of a plan of merger or consolidation
requires the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding shares
entitled to vote at the neeting.
9. § 351.400(2), RSMo 1959 (sale of assets): "[Niotice . ..shall be given
to each shareholder of record entitled to vote at such meeting within the time
and in the manner provided by this chapter for the giving of notice of meetings
of shareholders"; and § 351.420, RSMo 1959 (merger and consolidation): "Notice of
such meeting shall be given as provided in § 351.230." § 351.230.1, RSMo 1959,
requires the giving of notice not less than ten or more than thirty days before
the date of a shareholders' meeting "to each shareholder of record entitled to
vote at such meeting."
10. See Note, Merger and Consolidation in Iowa, 34 IowA L. REv. 67, 77-78
(1948).
11. I.e., the right to receive an agreed or appraised sum for his stock from
the corporation. See § 351.405, RSMo 1959 (sale of assets); § 351.455, RSMo 1959
(merger and consolidation).
12. BAKER & CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1480 (Supp. 3d
ed. 1959); BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 701; LATrIN, CORPORATIONS 524-25
(1959).
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to nor given notice of the meeting~2 A procedure is prescribed that must be
strictly observed, else his rights (if he has any) will be lost.' 4 To qualify for the
appraisal remedy, he must file written objection to the agreement or authorization (of which he may be unaware) on or before the day set for the shareholders'
meeting (of which he has no notice). 1 5 All things considered, this aspect of the
statutory procedure does not easily allow him to assert appraisal rights; to the
contrary, it bespeaks a calculated legislative unconcern for his lot.
A dissenting shareholder by whom appraisal rights may be asserted is one
"who shall not have voted in favor" of the proposed change.16 Can a shareholder
who is without voting rights meet this requirement?
Early analyses of appraisal statutes found this to be one of the unanswered
questions. The language, it was said, came from the English Companies Act
of 1862,17 which gave appraisal rights to shareholders who, among other things,
"did not vote in favor" of the proposition.' It presented no problem in England
in 1862 because nonvoting shares probably were unknown. 19 The interpretation of
"not voting in favor" generally considered the more plausible included all share20
holders except those voting in favor of the proposal, regardless of voting power.
Various arguments designed to induce doubt as to the evident sense of the
statute have been suggested. Any other interpretation, it is said, would "emasculate the remedy by excluding the large class of non-voting stock." 21 Also, the
nonvoting shareholder's case for payment "would be the strongest because he
has no voice in the consideration of the proposed plans and is powerless to prevent their consummation."22 Again, the language is ambiguous, and the courts
would be more likely to "resolve the ambiguity in favor of the shareholder who
had no vote but wished to be paid. ' 23 Finally, giving to appraisal statutes a
liberal construction favoring dissenting shareholders, "it seems that on principle
the right to object and demand payment should not be confined to those entitled to vote on the issue .. . , but should be enjoyed by every stockholder not
actually voting in favor." 24
There is, however, a more logical inference to be drawn from the languageone that avoids the charge of ambiguity and precludes a liberal or lax construc13. See note 9 supra.
14. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTIcE § 632 (1959); LATrIN, Op.
cit. supra note 12.
15. § 351.405, RSMo 1959 (sale of assets); § 351.455, RSMo 1959 (merger and
consolidation).
16. Ibid.
17. 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89, § 162 (1862).
18. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15
CORNELL L. Q. 420, 427 (1930).
19. Id. at 427 n.32.
20. Id. at 428. See also Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Shareholders, 27 COL.
L. REv. 547, 552 (1927); Note, Corporations-StatutoryRight of Dissenting Stockholders to Obtain Appraisal and Purchase of Shares, 16 VA. L. REv. 484, 491 (1930).
21. Levy, supra note 18, at 428.
22. Ibid.
23. Weiner, supra note 20, at 552 n.23.
24. 16 VA. L. REv. 484, 491 (1930).
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tion. "Who shall not have voted in favor" defines the class as including only
those shareholders who, having the right to vote, have either voted against
it or have refrained from voting for the plan. "But the right to vote must be
there. Else it might be argued why mention 'voting' if it were intended to include members who have no voting rights." 25
This view of the matter was taken in what probably is the only reported
decision of the question. In Application of Harwitz, 26 petitioners, owners and
holders of nonvoting preferred shares, sought an order appointing persons to
appraise the value of their shares. The case arose under a statute providing that
a corporation may sell certain assets with the consent of the holders of twothirds of the shares "entitled to vote thereon," and further providing that any
shareholder "not voting in favor" of such proposed sale may apply to have
such shares appraised and paid for upon compliance with the procedural requirements therein prescribed. Petitioners made and the court rejected all the friendly
arguments heretofore mentioned:
This position seems to me untenable for if it was the legislative intent
that section 20 should be applicable to nonvoting stock and that nonvoting stock should have the right to apply for appointment of appraisers
as well as voting stock, then there was no need to include in section 20
the phrase "entitled to vote thereon." This seems to me to indicate a clear
legislative intent to confine and limit the rights to appraisal under section
20 to voting stock only and as indicating the exclusion of nonvoting
2
stock. 7
Further evidence of a legislative purpose to exclude nonvoting shares from
appraisal rights in the case of a sale of assets, merger or consolidation is found
by a comparative reading of the procedure provided in the case of charter
amendment. There, under specified circumstances, preferred shareholders adversely affected by the proposed amendment are entitled to notice and to vote
as a class, "whether by the terms of the articles of incorporation such class be
entitled to vote or not."128 Thus, for that special occasion their shares are voting
shares, and the appraisal remedy is available, upon compliance with other conditions, to a limitedly enfranchised shareholder "who shall not have voted in favor
'
of the proposal. 29
WILLIAM H. PITTMAN*

*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
25. Levy, supra note 18.
26. 192 Misc. 91, 80 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
27. Id. at 93, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
28. § 351.090.1(3)(b), RSMo 1959.
29. § 351.090.1(4), RSMo 1959. See also § 351.205, RSMo 1959, where the
appraisal remedy is given to holders of preferred shares "who shall not have
voted in favor" of the resolution to redeem preferred shares. Here, too, the right
to notice of the meeting and to vote on the resolution is not restricted to shareholders entitled to vote by the terms of the articles of iacorporation. For this
specific purpose, all shares are voting shares.
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